Reinventing Juries:  Ten Suggested Reforms by Amar, Akhil Reed




No idea was more central to our Bill of Rights. - indeed, to
America's distinctive regime of government of the people, by
the people, and for the people - than the idea of the jury. Yet
no idea today has suffered more abuse - from benign neglect
to malignant hostility to cynical manipulation and strategic per-
version - than the idea of the jury. The groups I blame for
this sad betrayal - lawyers, judges, law professors, and to a
lesser extent, citizens - are well represented in this room this
evening.
I.
Well, now that (I hope) I've got your attention, let me ex-
plain. My first claim - the centrality of the jury to the Found-
ers - is a huge one but, I think, easy to prove.! Tl1e only right
secured in all state constitutions penned between 1776 and 1787
was the right of jury trial in criminal cases. The criminal jury
was one of only a handful of rights explicitly affirmed in the
Philadelphia Convention (in Article III); and the Convention's
only discussion of whether to add a more elaborate Bill of
Rights took place in response to concerns about protecting civil
juries. When the Convention imprudently omitted such a Bill,
Anti-Federalists pounced on the omission during the ratification
debates; and jury-protection clauses topped their wish lists. Of
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. This Essay derives from the Seventh Edward
L Barrett, Jr. Lecture, delivered on October 25, 1994 at the University of California at
Davis School of Law.
I For much more elaboration and documentation of my claims over the next few
pages, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The BiU of fflghts as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131
(1991).
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the six state ratifying conventions that floated amendment ideas,
five put forth two or more explicit jury proposals.
A close look at our Bill of Rights confirms all this. Three
amendments explicitly protect the jury: the Fifth Amendment
safeguards criminal grand juries, the Sixth further protects crimi-
nal petit juries, and the Seventh preserves civil juries. These
three clauses are only the most visible tip of the jury iceberg.
Let's start with the First Amendment, and its ringing defense of
freedom of speech and of the press. As the 1730s Zenger trial
had made clear and the 1790s imbroglio over the Alien and
Sedition Acts would confirm, freedom of the press was tightly
linked to jury trial in the 1780s. Indeed, the "no prior restraint"
doctrine that intertwined with freedom of the press had its
deepest roots in jury trial ideas. A prior restraint could issue
from a judge via an injunction, and have bite in contempt pro-
ceedings that excluded a jury; nonprior restraints, like libel
judgments, could have bite only if the government could per-
suade a jury of the publisher's peers to rule against him.
Now consider the Second Amendment. Like the jury idea, the
Second Amendment tried to empower ordinary citizens - "the
people." Indeed, the "militia" and the "jury" were cousins. Both
were local bodies, composed of ordinary citizens. Both were
collective, repUblican institutions. Militia service and jury service
were twin duties of good citizenship; and roughly speaking,
those adult male citizens eligible to serve on one were also eligi-
ble to serve on the other. Both the militia and the jury reflected
suspicion of paid, professional central officialdom - a central
standing army on the one hand, and judges, prosecutors, and
bureaucrats on the other. (And the Third Amendment, of
course, simply continued this suspicion of a paid, professional
standing army.)
The civil jury was at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.2
Modern case law has turned this Amendment upside down. At
the Founding, warrants were not required; they were disfavored:
."No warrant shall issue but upon ...." And they were
disfavored precisely because (like a prior restraint) they issued
from paid government bureaucrats and cut the jury out of the
• In addition to Amar, supra note I, at 1175-81, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757 (1994).
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loop: the whole purpose of a warrant was to cut off the citIzen
target's ability to sue the searcher or seizer in a civil jury tres-
pass action. In short, the Fourth and Seventh Amendments were
tightly linked: the preferred vehicle for litigating the Fourth
Amendment was a tort suit brought by a citizen and tried before
a Seventh Amendment jury of fellow citizens. And in this tort
suit, the key Fourth Amendment issue would be whether the
government's search or seizure had been "reasonable" - a stan-
dard tort question (like negligence) to be shaped over the long
run by juries in tandem with judges.
We have already noted the Fifth Amendment's explicit grand
jury clause; but let us now note two more Fifth Amendment jury
ideas. First, see how the Double jeopardy Clause snugly safe-
guards the role of the criminal jury. Article III and the Sixth
Amendment require that a criminal case be tried by a jury; and
the Double jeopardy Clause generally prevents appellate judges
from reversing that jury's verdict of acquittal. In effect, the Dou-
ble jeopardy Clause operates much like the second clause of the
Seventh Amendment, which generally prevents appellate judges
from overturning a civil jury's verdict. (This connection was well
understood by the Framers.)3 Next, consider the majestic Fifth
Amendment phrase, "due process of law." This grand phrase
traces back to Lord Coke, who defined it, in words well known
to all eighteenth century lawyers, as "indictment or presentment
of good and lawful men" - that is, a grand jury.4
Passing over the Sixth and Seventh Amendments - the tip of
our iceberg - we come to the Eighth, addressing bail and pun-
ishments. How, you may well ask, is the jury relevant here?
Aren't bail hearings and sentencing hearings often held by judg-
es sitting alone, without juries? Exactly so - but from another
perspective, this proves my point. Precisely because judges acting
• In addition to Amar, supra note I, at 1190 & n.261, see Akhil Reed Amar & Jona-
than Marcus, DoubleJeopardy Law After Rod1U!'J King, 95 COLUM. L. REv. I, 57-58 & nn.279-81
(1995). This protection of the jury's role is asymmetric; a defendant can appeal a jury ver-
dict of conviction, and a trial judge may overturn ajury conviction via a motion for judgment
of acquittal. But the Constitution protects acquittals by juries with more finality than ac-
quittals by judges. See gmeraUy Peter Western & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theury of
DoubleJeopardy, 1978 SUP. Cr. REv. 81, 124-34.
• In addition to Amar, supra note I, at 1190 & n.262, see Akhil Reed Amar, TM Bia of
Rights and tMFourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE LJ. 1193, 1248-50 (1992).
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without juries were suspect, the Bill of Rights had to put special
limits on them, limits in the Eighth Amendment. (So too in the
Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause, and in the First Amend-
ment rule against prior restraints.)
Well trained modem lawyers have been taught that the Ninth
Amendment is about - if it is about anything - individual
rights like privacy; and that the Tenth Amendment means - if
it means much at all - states' rights and federalism. Here, as
elsewhere, well trained lawyers would do well to read the text.
Both amendments explicitly speak of "the people" - of Ninth
Amendment "rights ... retained by the people" and Tenth
Amendment "powers . . . reserved . . . to the people." The Pre-
amble, of course, triumphantly trumpets the right and power of
"We the People" to collective self-govemance; and no phrase
appears in more of our first ten Amendments than the phrase
"the people." The core idea conjured up by this phrase is not
privacy, not federalism, but popular sovereignty - the idea of
the people's control over their mere agents in govemment.5
And this idea, in large measure, underlies the American idea of
jury trial, "trial[] by the people themselves" as Thomas Jefferson
exuberantly put the point in 1789.6
Well, that concludes my five-minute tour of the Founders'
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. I plead guilty to selective
emphasis - but the full texts are long, and time is shorL I
hope then, that, at least for now, I have said enough to win
your provisional assent to my first huge claim: that the jury idea
was absolutely central to the Founders' Bill of Rights, and their
distinctive constitutional idea of popular self-government. Let me
now move to my second huge claim: that the current state of
affairs betrays the jury and the people, and that lawyers, judges,
and law professors must bear much of the blame.
First, a few words of clarification. No, I am not arguing that
we can, or should want to, go back to everything that was said
and done in 1789. Much of our Constitution has changed.
• In addition to Amar, supra note I, at 1199-1201, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Guvemed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V. 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457,
489-94 (1994) and Akhil Reed Amar, Of SfJlJemgnty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1429-
51 (1987).
6 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), quoted in Amar,
supra note 1, at 1195 n.284.
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Amen! Or perhaps I should say "Amend!," for the most distinc-
tive changes have occurred through constitutional amendments
redefining "We the self-governing people" to include blacks,
women, the poor, and the young. But nothing in these glorious
Amendments - the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and
Twenty-Sixth, for those of you who are counting - moots the
jury idea. Rather, as we shall see, these new amendments reaf-
firm popUlar self-government and demand only that all the
people should count, and vote - count and vote, I shall argue,
in juries, too.
Nor am I ignoring larger forces at work over the last two
centuries - nationalism, bureaucratization, technological com-
plexity, and increasing specialization of labor. The jury idea
must make its peace with these forces, but a just peace calls for
creative accommodation rather than unconditional surrender of
the jury idea. Take nationalization, for example. At the Found-
ing, the jury - like much of the Bill of Rights - reflected
localist suspicion of central authority. The American Revolution,
born in local rebellion against imperial oppression, cast a long
localist shadow. But in the Civil War era, the national govern-
ment emerged as liberty's last best hope, and a new banner
unfurled: "Freedom National!" A new Bill of Rights arose - the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments - exempli-
fying this new nationalism. But in many ways this new national-
ism only strengthened the old jury idea. The Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted to reverse Barron v. Baltimore7 and ap-
ply the principles of the Bill of Rights .- including many of its
jury ideas - against the states;8 and as I noted in passing, the
Fifteenth Amendment created a national guarantee that states
allow blacks to vote, in juries and elsewhere. Similar adaptations
of the jury idea will be needed to accommodate bureaucratiza-
tion and specialization of labor, as we shall see. But here too,
the core populist idea of the jury trial must be retooled,9 not
retired.
7 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
8 For much more doeu'mentation and elaboration. see generally Amar. The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 4.
9 Or as Professor Lessig might say. "translated." See gmeralJy Lawrence Lessig. FuJelity in
Translation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1165 (1993).
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Finally, in placing much of the blame on lawyers, judges, and
law professors, I admit the importance of both materialism and
idealism. Material incentives matter, and so do ideas. Over two
centuries, lawyers - both prosecutors and defense attorneys -
have had strong incentives to aggrandize their own roles in
litigation at the expense ·of the jury. But their motives have been
partial and partisan; the parties have wrested control from the
whole people, embodied in the jury idea. The deepest constitu-
tional function of the jury is to serve the people, not the parties
- to serve them by involving them in the administration of jus-
tice and the grand project of democratic self-government. Alas,
over the years, short-term convenience of litigants has won out
against the long-run values of public education and participa-
tion. Judges, of course, are charged with protecting these endur-
ing constitutional values; but they too have perverse and partisan
incentives here. The jury was to check the judge - much as the
legislature was to check the executive, the House to check the
Senate, and the states to check the national government. On
this materialist account, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges have, over the centuries, contrived to carve up amongst
themselves things that rightfully belong to the jury - to all of
us, as citizens.
And why have we failed - as jurors, as citizens - to fight off
these creeping assaults? Here, too, a material incentive analysis is
helpful. Prosecutors and judges are professional repeat players;
defense attorneys are paid; whereas the people at large lack
tight organization. The benefits of jury service are widely dis-
persed - they redound to fellow citizens as well as the individu-
al jurors. But the individual juror bears all of the cost - the
hassle, the inconvenience, the foregone wages - of jury service.
Jury service is not just a right, but a duty; predictably few of us
have militantly insisted that we perform this duty, just as few of
us insisted in the Reagan years that we pay our fair share of the
intergenerational tax burden.10
Here is where law professors come in. For one socially useful
role of the not-for-hire academic should be to articulate long-
run systematic values that the partisans and the temporary, self-
'0 This material initiative analysis will be developed at greater length in a manuscript I
am currently clrauthoring with Professor Ian Ayres.
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interested agents will predictably slight. We have, for example, a
rich academic law and economics literature decrying special
interest rent-seeking - the honey subsidies, the grazing fee
giveaways, and so on - but we lack an equally vigorous litera-
ture championing the common good over the special interests
in jury law. Law professors have, in general, been better capital-
ists than democrats.
In the classroom, the big idea of the jury is carved up into a
few trivial ideas scattered across the curriculum. Civil Procedure
devotes a week or so to the Seventh Amendment; but this hard-
ly shows the jury in its best light. Fundamentally, the jury is, in
Tocqueville's phrase, a political institution not a procedural
one. 1I It exists to promote democracy for the jurors, not effi-
cient adjudication for the parties. Criminal Procedure professors
typically discuss a defendant: s right to a criminal jury; but what
about the people's right - and duty - to serve and vote on a
jury? In Criminal Procedure, antijury warrants typically become
the heroes of the Fourth Amendment story; celebration of
judge-fashioned exclusionary rules drowns out serious discussion
of the jury-driven tort suit at the Amendment's core; and the
only thing said about the grand jury (typically) is that a clever
prosecutor can get it to indict a ham sandwich. And what about
classes in Constitutional Law proper? The jury goes almost un-
mentioned. Prior restraint is taught as a press rule; the "judicial
department" means judges; and "democracy" means legislatures.
Federalism, legislative bicameralism, presentment, - all this and
much more are studied, but the big idea of the jury almost
never is. One is reminded of Humphrey Bogart's unforgettable
line in Casablanca12 when asked by Peter Lorre whether he (Bo-
gart) despises Lorre: "I probably would, if I gave you any
thought."
Outside the classroom, there is still more cause for shame.
When academics have publicly weighed in on jury debates in
this century, it has too often been on the wrong side -
trivializing the jury, mocking it, coming up with new theories for
whittling away its power. As a Yale man, I am happy to say that
the worst offenders here have been prominent men from Har-
II See infra text accompanying note 16.
.. (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1943).
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vard - Felix Frankfurter, Erwin Griswold, and Charles Fairman,
to name a fewl~ - but other schools have not lagged far be-
hind.
Now, I have painted with an extremely broad brush in sketch-
ing out this scathing indictment of lawyers, judges, and law
professors. I would be remiss if I left you all thinking that no
one stood up against this constitutional betrayal. Some did -
but too few. My own hero is the great Hugo Black, who had an
abiding faith in the Constitution, the jury, and the people. (And
for all this, he was mocked by sophisticated cynics in the acade-
my - wise fools!) Unlike most of his fellow Justices, Black had
practiced as a trial lawyer; it is perhaps unfortunate that the one
Court which has the most power to save or kill the jury has so
little familiarity with the institution, now that circuit riding is
ancient history.
II.
In the time I have left, I shall try to offer ten admittedly
broad and tentative suggestions for reinventing juries today -
preserving the Founders' big idea in our modern world. Ten is
an arbitrary number to be sure, but who am I to quarrel with
God and Moses on Sinai, the ratifiers of the federal Bill of
Rights in 1791, or David Letterman, for that matter? Because my
individual proposals are linked by a single vision, it is best, .I
think, to set out up front· some of the basic features of that
VISIon.
First, we must see the big idea of the jury generally, above
and beyond the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, respec-
tively. Grand juries, petit juries, and civil juries do differ from
each other, but they are all juries of sorts. Adjectives should not
obscure nouns. Also, we must see how this big idea connects up
to other constitutional ideas. In particular, three closely related
constitutional analogies strike me as especially fruitful: the legis-
lative analogy, the bicameral analogy, and the voting analogy.
" See, e.g., Amar, The BiU of Rights and the Fuurteenth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1266
n.309 and sources cited therein.
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At the Founding, analogies between legislatures and juries
abounded. In the words of a leading Anti-Federalist pamphle-
teer:
It is essential in every free country, that common people
should have a part and share of influence, in the judicial as
well as in the legislative department. ...
The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the col-
lection of the people by their representatives in the legisla-
ture ... have procured for them, in this country, their true
proportion of influence. . . .14
Closely related was the idea of bicameralism: just as the legis-
lature featured two equal branches, one upper and one lower,
so too with the judiciary. The judges constituted the upper
branch of the judicial department; the juries, the bicameral
lower branch.15 If we take these analogies seriously, certain jury
issues will appear in a new light.
Most important is the light cast by the voting analogy. Jurors
vote in juries, and ordinary voters have in America typically been
eligible to serve as jurors. As Tocqueville put the point:
The jury system as understood in America seems to me as
direct and extreme a consequence of the ... sovereignty of
the people as universal suffrage. They are both equally power-
ful means of making the majority prevail. ... [T]he jury is
above all a political institution [and] should be made to
harmonize with the other laws establishing the sovereign-
ty.... [F]or society to be governed in a settled and uniform
manner, it is essential that the jury lists should expand or
shrink with the lists of voters....
[In general] [i] n America all citizens who are electors have
the right to be jurors.16
In recent opinions, the Supreme Court has begun to reaffinn
this Tocquevillian vision, analogizing voting and jury service. 17
The analogy has broad implications, shifting analysis from a
litigant's right to be tried by a jury to a citizen's right to serve
and vote on a jury. As a result of this shift, a defendant's racial-
I. Letters from the Federal Fanner (IV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
249-50 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981).
.. See Amar, supra note I, at 1188-89.
16 ALExIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273,728 (Mayer ed., 1969).
17 See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 u.S. 614, 625-26 (1991); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,406-08 (1991).
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ly-based peremptory challenges do not protect his own legitimate
right to be tried by a jury he deems to be fair; rather, they
threaten the people's right to serve and vote on juries free from
racial discrimination. Race-based peremptory challenges, even in
the hands of a defendant, violate the Fifteenth Amendment; and
gender-based challenges violate the Nineteenth. The jury/voting
analogy has been analyzed - quite powerfully, I think - in a
recent article by a member of the V.C. Davis faculty, and so I
shall say no more here, lest I steal his thunder. 18 (Indeed, I
must be specially careful here, for he also happens to be my
brother, and he has been accusing me of stealing his stuff ever
since he turned two years old.)
With these general remarks framing the issue, let us now tum
to my top ten list (in no particular order) of suggested jury
reforms.
1. No Excuses
Citizens should not easily escape the duty, and "repeat-player
regulars" (lawyers and judges) should not easily deny citizens the
right, to serve on juries. Consider first citizen efforts to shirk
jury duty. In part, the shirking problem arises because those
who do serve are too often treated shabbily in a process run by
- and for the convenience of - repeat-player regulars. Reforms
on this front, which I shall outline in a moment, should solve
part of the problem. But not all of it. Specialization of labor
here is another culprit: specialization breeds inequality of citi-
zens, and the jury idea is rooted in equality. Less abstractly,
specialization means that many citizens may not want to give up
a week of their careers - and the big bucks they can make in
that week - to shoulder their equal share of duties of citizen-
ship.
A sensible system, I suggest, would require each CItIzen to
devote, say, one week a year to jury service - note the analogy
to the modem Swiss militia. Each citizen could "time shift" -
declare well in advance which week is most convenient - but
except for genuine emergencies, citizens should be obliged to
18 See Vikram D. Amar, Jury Servia as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNEll L.
REv. 239 (1995).
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serve when their week comes Up.19 We should tum specializa-
tion of labor to the service of democracy by, for example, pro-
viding professional specialized day care (or day care vouchers)
to enable homemakers - mainly women, today - to take their
turns in the project of collective self-governance.
And how should this obligation be enforced? Stiff fines are
one option. If you shirk your week, you must pay two weeks'
salary. (Flat fines, by contrast, would be functionally regressive,
and create incentives to shirk for high-salary citizens.) More
radically (and problematically), we could re-link jury service and
voting: If you want to opt out of the responsibilities of collective
self-government, fine - but you may not then exercise any of
its rights. You have two choices: to be a citizen, with democratic
rights and duties, or a subject, ruled by others. On this vi'ew,
you are not entitled to vote outside juries if you are unwilling to
serve and vote inside juries. If you are not willing to engage in
regular focused deliberation with a random cross section of
fellow voters, you should not be governing the polity, just as you
may not vote in the Iowa caucuses unless you attend and hear
the arguments. Citizens not only have freedom to speak to fel-
low citizens on issues of public concern: they have duties to
listen. As a practical matter these duties are generally unenforce-
able; but the jury provides a forum to force citizens who might
never engage each other - they live in different neighbor-
hoods, work in different worlds, attend different schools, wor-
ship in different churches - to listen to each other, and delib-
erate collectively.
Two obvious objections arise. First, isn't the no-serve, no-vote
rule a type of in-kind poll tax, outlawed by the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment?20 Perhaps, but note that unlike a flat fee, a per-
sonal service poll tax bites the wealthy as much as the poor, and
" Long trials lasting more than a week raise distinct problems - the longer the trial,
the greater the difficulty in assembling a truly cross-sectional jury. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 26-28. Not all citizens will be able to selVe without huge sacrifice, and when they
drop out, the remaining pool can be skewed by self-selection. Note, however, that grand
juries do typically sit over extended periods, though they do not always meet full time.
20 Though the Twenty-Fourth Amendment by its tenns applies only to voting in federal
elections - and thus by analogy to federal juries - its anti-wealth-discrimination principles
have been deemed applicable against states. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
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thus avoids class discrimination - the real mischief that the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment was designed to redress. If requiring
Iowa's citizens to listen before they vote in caucuses does not
violate the Amendment, requiring them to serve on juries may
not be so different.
A second objection runs like this: "If jury service is ultimately
designed to reconnect the citizens with each other and the
polity, we must remember that voting also reconnects. We
should be encouraging voting, not discouraging it, and so the
no-serve, no-vote rule undennines its long-run goal." For me,
this is a weighty, and perhaps dispositive, objection; but I also
fear that too many citizens see voting as private and not public:
"I'm entitled to vote on any basis I see fit, and don't have to
explain or justify myself to fellow citizens. Voting is private and
self-regarding - what I do in the ballot booth is like what I do
in the bedroom - it's nobody else's bUsiness." I think this view
is deeply wrong. We have secret ballot rules to cure second-best
problems of force and fraud that would occur if thugs could
monitor your vote,21 not because voting is inherently private or
self-regarding. Perhaps too many people today are voting for the
wrong reasons - and relinking voting to jury service may help
remind them of the true, public-regarding nature of these
rights.
Once we solve the shirking problem and enforce the duty to
serve, we must deal with the flip-side of the coin: the efforts of
repeat-player regulars to deny the citizen her right to serve. Ex-
cuses for cause should be extremely limited: If you are the
brother-in-law of the plaintiff, you may be excused; but you may
not be excused merely because you happen to have ideas -
what self-governing citizen shouldn't have ideas? Put simply, a
juror should have an open mind but not an empty mind. It is
sad that in order to try Oliver North, you couldn't know who he
21 See generalJy JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GoVERNMENT
154-58 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1958)(Chapter X: ·Of the Mode of Voting").
HeinOnline -- 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1181 1994-1995
1995] ReinventingJuries 1181
was.22 Too often, juries come up with stupid results because we
let the parties pick stupid jurors in stupid ways.
The bicameralism analogy is quite helpful here: the same
standard for recusal should apply to judge and juror. Indeed, if
anything, juror bias is less problematic, because the juror is only
one of twelve, and must openly articulate reasons to persuade
her peers,23 whereas a biased judge can single-handedly manip-
ulate the proceedings in ways hard to detect and reverse. (And
our juror will sit one week a year; our judge, fifty.)
At the federal level, repeat-player regulars should not be able
to conspire to excuse criminal jurors en masse by agreeing to a
bench trial. Article III demands that the trial for "all crimes shall
be by jury" and "shall" and "all" meant just that to the Framers.
So said unanimous Supreme Courts in the nineteenth century,
but since the New Deal, the Court has wrongly allowed defen-
dants who plead not guilty to be tried by judges alone.24 The
bicameralism analogy here has bite: an Article III judge sitting
without a criminal jury is not a criminal court with jurisdiction,
just as the Senate sitting without the House is not a legislature.
(Whether this Article III mandate should be imposed on state
criminal proceedings is, of course, a different question.)25
22 Actually, in the North case, there was a seemingly strong reason to excuse jurors
who had seen North testify on television, because this testimony was procured under a
grant of immunity, and thus strictly inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. (I am in-
debted to Betsy Cavendish for this reminder.) But this Fifth Amendment wrinkle does not
exist in most other high profJle cases, where intelligent and well-informed jurors are dis-
missed precisely because they are intelligent and well-informed. And if someone is intelli-
gent and well-informed, should we not at least consider using the scalpel of strict instruc-
tions - "you must base your verdict only on the evidence admitted in this trial"-rather
than the sledgehammer of exclusion? A judge with comparable knowledge is not disquali-
fied here. Why do we trust judges so much andjurors so little?
For fascinating data on how a multi-layered jury selection process "dummied down"
the original jury pool (as measured by percentage of college graduates and knowledge of
Watergate) in a high profile case involving political figures, see Hans Zeisel & Shari S.
Diamond, The Jury Selection in the Mitchell-Stans Conspiracy Trial, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J.
lSI, 158-61.
.. It might be feared that a single eccentric juror today might simply sit mute and
refuse to engage her peers. For my suggested corrective, see infra text accompanying note
47.
•• See generally Amar, supra note I, at 1196-99. This shift cannot be defended on the
libertarian ground of giving defendants more constitutional choices, since the Court has
not recognized any constitutional right of a defendant to a bench trial over the objection
of a prosecutor. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
.. See generally Amar, The BiU 0/ Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 4, at
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2. Preempting Peremptories
By and large, the first twelve persons picked by lottery should
form the jury. The jury - and not just the venire - should be
as cross-sectional of the entire community of the whole people
as possible. Peremptory challenges should be eliminated: they
allow repeat-player regulars - prosecutors and defense attorneys
- to manipulate demographics and chisel an unrepresentative
panel out of a cross-sectional venire.26
The suggestion here closely builds on my first one. Juries
should represent the people, not the parties. pemocracy is well
served if juries force together into common dialogue a fair cross
section of citizens who might never deliberate together anywhere
else.
All the broad principles outlined earlier - the big idea of
the jury generally, the legislative analogy, the bicameral analogy,
the voting analogy - cut against peremptories. We do not let a
defendant handpick a. personalized designer legislature to fash-
ion the norms governing his conduct; or the prosecutor who
pursues him; or the grand jury that indicts him; or the judge
who tries him; or the appellate court that reviews his case. We
do not try - and I'll resist the temptation to wisecrack here -
to pick the most stupid persons imaginable to serve in our legis-
latures, or on our judiciary. When ordinary citizens vote, they
have never been subject to a reverse literacy test reflected in the
following joke: "Knock knock ... Who's there? .. OJ....
OJ. who? ... Congratulations, you're on the jury!" And in vot-
ing, we are especially uneasy about depriving citizens of the
right to vote on the basis of discretionary and low-visibility judg-
ments that may mask racial or sexual prejudice and stereotyping.
Three big arguments support peremptories. First is the idea
of legitimacy: the parties will better respect a decision reached
by a body they helped to select. But what about the legitimacy
of the verdict for the rest of society - We the People who see
weird juries, chosen in weird and expensive ways, generate weird
outcomes? And the trial judge, appellate court, legislature, and
grand jury are legitimate even though the defendant didn't
1260-72.
26 Consider, for example, the data discussed in Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 22.
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handpick any of them or have any peremptory challenges. And
so here we have a good example of repeat-player regulars dress-
ing up their power grab against the jury in the name of princi-
ple.
Next is the prophylactic argument from voir dire: we must
allow a defense counsel to probe jurors with incisive questions at
voir dire; and counsel needs peremptories to vigorously exercise
this right, lest counsel offend a juror for whom no provable
grounds exist for a "for cause" dismissal. But since I propose
getting rid of almost all "for cause" dismissals and thus most voir
dire, the prophylactic argument collapses.
Finally, there is the argument from the long history of
peremptories. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear
that no constitutional right to peremptories exists:27 they are as
much a relic of an imperfectly democratic past as the now dead
(or at least dying) "key man" system for generating venires.
Peremptories at the Founding, I suspect, were typically exercised
as a polite way of dismissing folks with personal knowledge of
the parties. In a largely homogeneous community, peremptory
challenges would rarely skew the demographics of the eventual
jury.28 But after the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, we
must be vigilant to prevent racial and gender discrimination
wrapped in the inscrutable cloak of the peremptory challenge.
To take the voting analogy and Reconstruction seriously, we
should choose to vindicate the more modern constitutional right
to vote free from discrimination over the more ancient
nonconstitutional right to exclude jurors on the basis of unartic-
ulated prejudice.
27 See, e.g., Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 538, 586 (1919); Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Georgia v. McCollum,
112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992).
.. In conversation, Professor Stan Krauss has expressed some reservations about this
point. I look fonvard to his eventual publication of his historical work on American juries,
and may well adjust or abandon my hunch when this work comes out. As my next sentenc-
es make clear, my most important historical and structural claims here focus less on the
Founding, and more on the Reconstruction and Progressive Era visions.
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3. Regularizing Juries
If you're still on board - and I suspect some of you may
have jumped off the freight train a while back - my next sug-
gestion should follow naturally. We should try to regularize ju-
ries - empower them in ways that make them less vulnerable to
encroachments of the repeat-player regulars, without turning
them into professionals themselves. First, a single jury, once
constituted, should be able to try several cases in a row. If you
can hear four quick cases in your week a year, great! The grand
jury hears more than one indictment; the judge sits on more
than one case; and the legislature may decide more than one
issue in a session (though the 1994 session of Congress made
me wonder). In England, at least, a typical seventeenth or eigh-
teenth century jury did sit for several cases seriatim.29 Delibera-
tion among fellow citizens will be enhanced; the burden of jury
service will be more evenly distributed - one week for every-
one; and more trials can take place if we get rid of all the
wasteful preliminaries like elaborate voir dire and peremptories.
Remembering the big idea of juries generally, perhaps we
should have a single jury hear both civil and criminal cases in
its week. Note finally, that though we are regularizing the jury,
we have not professionalized it: one week a year will not turn
citizens into government bureaucrats, though it will give citizens
regular practice in the art of deliberation and self-government.
We should also pay jurors for their time. Again, one week a
year will not turn them into professionals, but payment at a fair
flat rate will enable a broad cross-section to serve. The legislative
and bicameral analogies suggest payment; judges and legislators
are paid for their time. At first the voting analogy seems to cut
the other way: we do not pay voters to vote. But the time spent
going to polls and voting - one hour perhaps - is much less
than the week a year involved in jury service. To decline to
compensate citizens for their sacrifice - or to pay them $5 per
day as is done in many California courts - is in effect to im-
pose a functionally regressive poll tax that penalizes the working
poor who want to serve and vote on juries, but who cannot
.. See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L REv. 263,
274-75 (1978).
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afford the loss of a week's pay. Payment should come from the
government, not private employers. All jurors are equal as ju-
rors, and should be paid equally. One person, one vote, one
paycheck.
Most controversially, we should sometimes allow juries to hire
support staff, if necessary. In a world of increasing complexity
and specialization of labor, few can do an important job well
without support. If legislators and judges can have staffs, why
not grand juries?!lO We trivialize juries when we insist that they
- and only they - must stay in the eighteenth century world
of generalists. Because juries are single-shot entities rather than
continuing bodies, they have predictably lost out to ongoing
repeat players over two centuries. Perhaps a pennanent staff
with undivided loyalty to the jury itself - with mandatory tenn
limits to prevent the staff from entrenching itself and using the
jury as a ventriloquist's dummy to advance its own agenda -
.should be considered.
4. Respecting Juries
My next proposals are far more modest. (Some of you, I'm
sure, have been wondering if I would ever say anything modest.)
Some judges do not allow jurors to take notes. This is idiocy.
Judges take notes, grand jurors take notes, legislators take notes
- what's going on here? If juries today come up with stupid
results sometimes, don't put the blame on them alone. Why
shouldn't juries be told at the outset of a case- in plain English,
not legalese - what the basic elements of the charged offenses
are, so they can be thinking of them, and checking them off in
their notebooks, as the trial unfolds? If judges are allowed to ask
questions from the bench, should not juries at least be allowed
to forward questions to the judge to be asked, if not substantive-
ly inappropriate?!!! More generally, we must try to design the
system to welcome jurors. Like Ronald Reagan in that famous
.. See Ronald F. Wright, Why Not AdministTative OrandJuriesr, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 465, !H6
(1992).
" Professor Stan Krauss has informed me that American juries were quite active in
trials at least through the middle of the nineteenth century. Some juries even caused wit-
nesses to be recalled, and asked witnesses clarifying questions after the cases had been
submitted to the jury, and jury deliberation had begun.
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New Hampshire debate (or was it Spencer Tracy in State of the
Union?52) they are the ones paying for these proceedings, and
they are entitled to be treated with respect. Instead, all too
often, they are treated rudely by court regulars, made to wait in
cramped and uncomfortable quarters, treated as if their time
had no value, shuttled around without explanation, and so on.
We should use juries to reconnect citizens with each other and
with their government. Mter serving on a jury, a citizen should,
in general, feel better - less cynical, more public-regarding -
about our system, but our current regime, run for the conve-
nience of the regulars, too often has exactly the opposite ef-
fect. 55
5. Educating the People
Once we start thinking about the jury from the perspective of
democracy rather than adjudication - from the viewpoint of
the citizenry rather than the litigants - other possibilities open
up. Let us again hear Tocqueville's words:
To regard the jury simply as a judicial institution would be
taking a very narrow view of the matter, for great though its
influence on the outcome of lawsuits is, its influences on the
fate of society itself is much greater still. The jury is therefore
above all a political institution, and it is from that point of
view that it must always be judged.... [The jury] should be
regarded as a free school which is always open and in which
each juror learns his rights. . . . I do not know whether a
jury is useful to the litigants, but I am sure it is very good for
those who have to decide the case. I regard it as one of the
most effective means of popular education at society's dispos-
al.M
.. (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1948).
53 For a discussion of the empirical evidence, see NancyJ. King, The Effects of Race-Con-
scious Jury Selection on Public Conjidmce in tM Fairness ofJury Proceedings: An EmpiriaJl Puzzle,
31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1177, 1185-86 (1995).
I am heartened here by a recent conversation with Justice Joyce Kennard, who now
sits on the California Supreme Court. When she served as a trial judge, she always made a
point of thanking jurors and soliciting their observations and suggestions about their jury
experience. Indeed, she routinely administered questionnaires to jurors who had complet-
ed their service, inviting them to comment on all aspects of their jury experience. This is
exactly the sort of thing I am calling for here.
M TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 16, at 272, 275.
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If this is the big idea, why not take advantage of new technol-
ogy to advance it? Jury deliberations can be videotaped.55 Even
if these deliberations can never be introduced to impeach the
jury's verdict - just as The Brethren 56 is inadmissible evidence
to overturn a Supreme Court case - the videotape can be used
(perhaps after some time delay in sensitive cases) as high school
teaching materials about democracy in action. For those who
find the legislative analogy useful, think of how much C-SPAN
broadcasts of legislative debates and hearings have contributed
to public education.
Indeed, we might even go a step' further. Opponents of the
jury often attack it for being a "black box" and for failing to
"give reasons." But inscrutability and muteness are not the es-
sence of juries - one of the historic functions of grand juries,
for example, was to issue reports and presentments, as we shall
see. If a criminal petit jury or civil jury would like to explain its
reasons beyond a terse "guilty" or '~udgment for plaintiff," per-
haps we should allow the jury to employ a "jury clerk" - akin
to today's judicial clerk - to help compose a statement of rea-
sons that will enhance public understanding and education.57
6. Safety in Numbers
For the Framers, a criminal jury meant "twelve men, good
and true." Today, in light of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-
Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, we must update all this:
"men" must include women, too, and "good and true" jurors
55 At the federal level, this videotaping would require a change in the law. See 18
U.S.C. § 1508 (1988) (prohibiting recording or observing jury deliberations).
,. BOB WOODWARD & SCOrr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979) .
., My.views of juries and jury secrecy here may well differ from those of my distin-
guished colleague, Abe Goldstein. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The
Problem ofPostverdict Interoiew, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 295. With due respect, I think Professor
Goldstein fails to give enough stress to the jury as a political institution in an open, demo-
cratic society. For Goldstein, the "genius" of the jury lies in its "inscrutability." Id. at 314.
For me - and, I submit, for the Framers - the genius of the jury lies in its democratic
character.
For a thoughtful and more narrow argument that the public need not be given pri-
vate information about individual jurors - their addresses, their questionnaire responses,
even their names - see Nancy J. King, The Case for More Routine Use of Anonymous
Juries in Criminal Trials (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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include the black, the poor, and the young. But twelve should
still mean twelve.
Almost no one on the Supreme Court ever thought otherwise
until recently. But when the criminal jury right was incorporated
against the states, via the Fourteenth Amendment, in 1968, the
Court signalled a willingness to water down this clear historical
rule to accommodate state traditions of smaller juries.!l8 Today
- in state courts at least - criminal juries of less than twelve
jurors are permitted.39 And this lax rule has now made its way
into the federal courts on the civil side, where six-person juries
have been blessed by the Supreme Court as satisfying the Sev-
enth Amendment.40
The Court has noted that the number twelve does not explic-
itly appear in the Constitution.41 And there is nothing magic
about twelve - just as there is nothing inherent in a top ten
list. But both have a fair amount of history behind them, and
once we move off twelve, where shall we stop? If eleven is
enough, why not ten? If ten, why not nine? By mathematical
induction, we unravel down to one; and clearly something has
gone wrong. If the number is at some point arbitrary, why not
stick with one that has history clearly on its side?
And here are two more fundamental reasons for twelve over
six - which is where the current Court seems ready to draw the
line.42 First, if jury service is a positive good - a democratic
plus - isn't twelve twice as good as six? More citizens will par-
ticipate and be educated at Tocqueville's school. Second, if we
want individual juries to be cross-sectional, to draw citizens from
different backgrounds together in common deliberation, we
should want each jury to be of substantial size. A minority per-
spective is less likely to be represented on a jury of six than on
one of twelve. And so the deep inclusionary and cross-sectional
spirit of later amendments (Fifteen, Nineteen, Twenty-Four, and
Twenty-Six) confirms our founding vision of safety in large num-
bers. If anything, if twelve is not sacred, we should consider
58 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968).
,. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) .
.. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) .
•, WiUiams, 399 U.S. at 86-100.
• 2 Ballew, 435 U.S. 223.
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increasing the size of juries. Once again, the big idea of juries
generally supports this: grand juries typically have twenty-three
members. (The legislative analogy is also helpful here - most
legislatures have more than twelve members.)
7. (Super) Majority Rule?
But all this leads to anotJier controversial - and I admit
highly tentative - suggestion. Perhaps, even in criminal cases,
we should move away from unanimity toward majority or
supermajority rule on juries.
Founding history is relatively clear. A criminal jury had to be
unanimous. But like the number twelve, this .clear understanding
was not explicitly inscribed into the Constitution, and the mod-
ern Supreme Court has upheld state rules permitting convictions
on 10-2 votes.43
Beyond this precedent, four main arguments support my
suggestion that nonunanimous verdicts should be constitutionally
permissible. First, unlike the jury size issue, once we depart from
the Framers' clear starting point, we do not slide all the way
down a slippery slope. Six was not a stable jury number, but
majority rule has unique mathematical properties, and surely no
one could think that a defendant could be convicted by a minor-
ity vote. Majority rule thus sets a principled lower bound for any
reform. Second, at the Founding, unanimity may have drawn its
strength from certain metaphysical and religious ideas about
Truth that are no longer plausible: some may have thought that
all real Truths would command universal - unanimous - as-
sent.44 Third, most of our analogies tug toward majority rule -
legislatures generally use it; voters abide by it; appellate benches
follow it (even in criminal cases); and grand juries are governed
by it45 - or supermajority rule: in the impeachment context,
.. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Apodaca's current status is hardly
c1earcut, since it failed to generate a majority opinion. A four Justice plurality upheld
Oregon's rule allowing nonunanimous jury verdicts on the theory that the Sixth Amend-
ment does not require unanimity to convict. A fIfth Justice concurred, but on the very
different theory that the Sixth Amendment does not incorporate jot-forjot against states.
See also Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) .
... Thus, we may have an example of what Professor Lessig has termed an "Erie effect"
calling for a changed reading. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed ReadingJ: Fidelity
and Theory, 47 STAN. L REv. 395,426-38 (1995).
.. The jury in ancient Athens - the cradle of democracy - was large and randomly
HeinOnline -- 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1190 1994-1995
1190 University oj California, Davis [Vol. 28:1169
the House, acting as a kind of grand jury, votes by majority rule,
but the Senate, acting as a kind of petit jury, must summon a
two-thirds vote to convict.46
Last, and most important, all my other suggested reforms put
tremendous pressure on unanimity. Unanimity within a jury at
the Founding was nestled in a cluster of other rules that now
must fall. Blacks, women, and the poor were excluded from
voting and jury service too. Key man systems rounded up the
usual suspects - a set of relatively homogeneous citizens to
seIVe. Peremptory challenges could further trim off outliers on a
distributional CUIVe. But if everyone now gets to seIVe on a jury,
and we eliminate all the old undemocratic barriers, preserving
unanimity might also be undemocratic, for it would create an
extreme minority veto unknown to the Founders. In practice
this minority veto could disempower juries by preventing an
intolerably large percentage of jury cases from ever reaching a
final verdict.
Even at the Founding, perhaps unanimous jury verdicts exist-
ed in the shadow of a jury custom of majority rule. Juries would
discuss the matter and vote on guilt; and even if the minority
were unconvinced about guilt, they would in the end vote to
convict after they had been persuaded that the majority had
listened to their arguments in good faith. This custom might be
hard to institutionalize today, but it bears some resemblance to
legislative "unanimous consent" rules. A single lawmaker may
often slow down proceedings - force her colleagues to deliber-
ate more carefully on something that matters to her - but in
the end she may not prevent the majority from implementing its
judgment. Perhaps the same should hold true for juries. Recall
selected, often heard more than a single case, and operated by majority rule. (I am indebt-
ed to Shawn Chen for this reminder.) See gemraUy MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHE-
NIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES (fA. Crook trans., 1991).
.. Note, however, that a two-thirds vote in defendant's favor is not necessary for an
acquittal in impeachmenL Civil libertarians may well wonder whether jury unanimity
should be necessary to acquit a criminal defendanL If so, the consequence is that the prose-
cutor needs only one sympathetic juror to hang a jury and inflict another trial on defen-
danL As the impeachment analogy reminds us, logic does not mandate symmetry (though
other reasons for symmetry may exist).
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once again Tocqueville: "The jury system [and] universal suf-
frage . . . are both equally powerful means of making the majority
prevail."47
In allowing juries to depart from unanimity, we must try to
.preserve the ideal of jury deliberation and self-education -
jurors should talk to and listen to each other seriously and with
respect. Friends of unanimity argue that it promotes serious
deliberation - everyone's vote is necessary, so everyone is seri-
ously listened to. But unanimity cannot guarantee mutual toler-
ance - what about the eccentric holdout who refuses to listen
to, or even try to persuade, others ("you can't make me, so
there!"). Conversely, nonunanimous schemes can be devised to
promote serious discussion. Jurors should be told that their job is
to talk and listen to others with different ideas, views, back-
grounds and so on. So too, judges can advise jurors that their
early deliberations should focus on the evidence and not their
tentative leanings or votes - and that no straw poll should be
taken until each juror has had a chance to talk about the evi-
dence on both sides. Institutionally, perhaps we might try a
scheme where on Day 1, a jury must be unanimous to convict;
on Day 2, 11-1 will suffice; on Day 3, 10-2, and so on, until we
hit our bedrock limit of, say two-thirds (for conviction), or ma-
jority rule (for acquittal). To discourage jurors in the (early)
majority from freezing out and waiting out the (early) minority,
and to encourage the (early) minority to make arguments rather
than filibuster, jurors should be told that the whole purpose of
our sliding vote scheme is to give a sole holdout on Day 1 a fair
chance to pick up a convert by Day 2, and so on.
8. Jury Review
So far, I have focused more on criminal juries than civil.
Tocqueville, however, found civil juries even more educational
for the citizenry than criminal ones. At the Founding, a key role
for all juries was to protect citizens from government abuse -
and the paradigmatic Seventh Amendment case was one brought
by an aggrieved citizen against an abusive government official.
We should revive this grand tradition, especially in Fourth
47 TOCQUEVlu.E, supra note 16, at 273 (emphasis added).
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Amendment cases. Elsewhere, I have followed in the footsteps of
the great Dean for whom this Lecture Series is named, and who
is with us here tonight, in voicing serious reservations about the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.48 Whether or not you
share our concern about letting guilty criminals go free, I hope
you see the need to strengthen remedies for the truly innocent
citizen wrongly searched. (The exclusionary rule is no help here
- there is no criminal evidence to exclude because our citizen
is not a criminal.)
For our purposes tonight, what is especially noteworthy is the
part that Seventh Amendment juries should play in helping to
define which searches and seizures are "reasonable" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Constitution comes
from the people, and the people should have some role in
administering it and saying what it means.49 Often, legislators
and judges will properly lay down rules establishing the per se
reasonableness or the per se unreasonableness of certain types
of searches and seizures, much as they lay down rules establish-
ing per se negligence and per se non-negligence (safe harbors)
in tort law. But sometimes reasonableness will call for a contex-
tual, common sense assessment that defies broad categorization,
and sometimes a jury will be the best body to make this com-
mon sense and democratic assessment. And so' here too, the
bicameralism analogy is useful. Just as judges can review actions
of government for unconstitutionality - .Marbury-style judicial
reviewSO - sometimes juries can too, as when assessing the
mixed fact and law question of Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness.51
.. See Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 2; Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Person-
al Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 46; Edward L. Barrett,
Jr., Exclusion ofEvidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL.
L. REv. 565 (1955).
4' In ancient Athens, juries could sometimes decide upon the constitutionality of a law
under the system of graphe paranomon. (Here too, I am indebted to Shawn Chen.) See genir-
ally Mogens Herman Hansen, The Political Puwer of the People's Court in Fourth Century Athens,
in THE GREEK CI1Y FROM HOMER To ALEXANDER 225 (0. Murray & S. Price eds., 1990).
50 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5/ To give jurors more familiarity and confidence with Fourth Amendment issues, and
to create more uniformity across decisions so as to give more guidance to police officers,
perhaps it might be sensible to convene a special "Fourth Amendment" jury. Such a jury
would sit for several weeks and hear a string of cases alleging "unreasonable" government
conduct This may also be an especially good place to use jury clerks. See supra notes 30, 37
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9. Why Not Administrative Grand Juries?
So asks my friend Ron Wright, in a recent issue of the Admin-
istrative Law RJroiew.52 Professor Wright's inspiring idea is to find
niches in administrative agencies where citizen input, citizen
advisory panels, citizen oversight groups, and so on, would be
desirable and workable. I shall not go into detail here (it would
hard to improve on "the Wright· stuff') but I shall simply note
how Ron's work is in the best tradition of the creative accom-
modation I am urging tonight. The Founders knew not the
modem administrative state, but they did try to build citizen
involvement into every branch of government they did know: a
lower legislative branch of rotating citizen-legislators (or so they
thought), criminal prosecutions that would involve grand juries,
and bicameral judicial trials featuring juries in both civil and
criminal cases. Now that a massive administrative branch has
arisen, fidelity to deep constitutional structure should lead us to
try to find room, here, too, for the people.5~
10. Preserving Presentments
In his celebrated 1790 Lectures on Law, Founder James Wil-
son described the grand jury as:
a great channel of communication, between those who make
and administer the laws, and those for whom the laws are
made and administered. All the operations of government,
and of its ministers and officers, are within the compass of
their view and research. They may suggest publick improve-
ments and the modes of removing publick inconveniences:
they may expose to publick inspection, or to publick punish-
ment, publick bad men, and publick bad measures.54
In exposing corruption and wrongdoing, grand juries used the
devices of presentments and reports, bringing to light abuses
that the citizenry at large had a right to know about, even if no
indictable offense had occurred. In an elegant student note, my
sometime co-author Renee Lettow suggests reviving the tradition
and accompanying text.
5. See supra note 30.
55 Once again, 1 borrow from Professor Lessig's ideas about "faithful" "translations." See
Lessig, supra note 9.
54 2 WORKS OF JAMES WlUiON 537 (Robert McCloskeyed., 1967).
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of grand jury presentments, giving a cross-sectional deliberative
body of citizens a more active and visible role than that of pros-
ecutorial rubber stamp.55 I commend you to her celebration of
the efforts of a Rocky Flats, Colorado, grand jury to alert fellow
citizens about perceived government malfeasance and self-deal-
ing; and her description of the efforts of repeat-player regulars
like the federal judge to muzzle the grand jury. She has stated
her case well, and it too, belongs on a short list of potential jury
refonns.
Underlying Lettow's arguments - and Wright's too, for that
matter - is the vision I have tried to conjure up for you to-
night: what I have called at times tonight "the big idea of the
jury," and at other times, "popular sovereignty." The vision is a
demanding one - and at times, an expensive one, too. Some of
my proposed refonns may, in the short run, cost money. Public
education is always costly, in the short run. But in the long run
- at least in a government of the people, by the people, and
for the people - public ignorance is always more expensive, as
the Founders of this great University and great Law School, and
of our Constitution too, well understood.
.. See Renee Lettow, Note, Reviving GrandJury Presentments, 103 YALE LJ. 1333 (1994).
